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Abstract
This paper proposes a simple descriptive model for discrete-time dou-
ble auction markets of divisible assets. As in the classical models of ex-
change economics, we consider a finite set of agents described by their ini-
tial endowments and preferences. Instead of the classical Walrasian-type
market models, however, we assume that all trades take place in double
auctions where the agents communicate through sealed limit orders for
buying and selling. We find that, in repeated call auctions, nonstrategic
bidding leads to a sequence of allocations that converges to individually
rational Pareto allocations.
1 Introduction
Most modern securities exchanges are based on the double auction mechanism
where potential buyers and sellers submit limit orders (a market order can be
viewed as a limit order with a very generous limit on the price) and the most
generous offers are selected for trade by crossing the demand and supply curves.
Ever since the pioneering works of Smith [14], double auctions have been found
to lead quickly to efficient allocations but the phenomenon has remained largely
unexplained by theory; see e.g. [3] and [13, Section 3] or the collections [15], [8]
and [10] for further evidence and analysis. Section 3 of [7] surveys mathematical
models proposed for the analysis of double auctions.
This paper studies discrete-time double auctions in the classical set-up of
welfare economics with a finite set of agents with given endowments and pref-
erences. We assume that all trades take place in a double auction and that
the agents submit limit orders according to their indifference prices. In general,
indifference prices depend not only on the agents’ preferences but also on their
current endowments which change whenever an agent is involved in a trade. We
find that, when the double auction is repeated, the allocations converge to a
Pareto allocation. Moreover, the speed of convergence is linear in the sense that
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the total consumer surplus is inversely proportional to the number of iterations.
The total surplus of the double auction is zero exactly when the double auction
clears with zero trades. As essentially proved already by Debreu [4] (see Sec-
tion 4 below), the surplus is zero if and only if the current allocation is Pareto
efficient. The discovered convergence rate thus explains the efficiency of double
auctions observed in empirical studies.
The convergence occurs when the preferences of the agents remain fixed. In
practice, the agents’ information and preferences and thus, equilibrium prices,
change over time. In such a setting, our model would give a structural de-
scription of how external factors affect trading and price dynamics. Even with
static preferences, all trading in our model occurs out of equilibrium and the
trading stops only at equilibrium. The same is true of all markets in practice
where disequilibrium is the driving force behind trading; see Fisher [5] for a
comprehensive discussion and further analysis of disequilibrium economics.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section starts by
reviewing the double auction mechanism as implemented in terms of limit orders
in modern securities exchanges. The auction is then formulated in terms the
problem of maximizing the consumer surplus. Section 3 presents our model of
the market where a finite set of agents is described by their endowments and
preferences over different holdings. Section 4 relates double auction equilibria
with Pareto allocations. Section 5 proves convergence to Pareto allocations
when the double auction is repeated.
2 Limit orders and double auctions
Consider a double auction market where a finite set I of agents submit limit
orders to buy and sell a given asset. A buy-limit order consists of a price-
quantity pair (pbi , q
b
i ) where p
b
i is the maximum unit price the agent is willing to
pay for the asset and qbi is the maximum number of units the agent is willing
to buy at this price. Similarly, a sell-limit order (pai , q
a
i ) specifies the minimum
unit-price and the maximum quantity for selling the asset. Of course, an agent
may be only interested in buying or selling. Such agents have qsi = 0 or q
b
i = 0.
The market is cleared by matching the maximum number x¯ of buy limit or-
ders with sell limit orders, that is, x¯ is the largest number such that s(x¯) ≤ d(x¯),
where s and d are the supply and demand curves, respectively; see Figure 1. For
each x, the value s(x) is the marginal price when buying a total of x units from
the most generous sellers. Mathematically, the supply curve is the nondecreas-
ing function given by
s(x) = inf
I′⊂I
{sup
i∈I′
psi |
∑
i∈I′
qsi ≥ x}.
Analogously, the demand curve is the nonincreasing function given by
d(x) = sup
I′⊂I
{ inf
i∈I′
pbi |
∑
i∈I′
qbi ≥ x}.
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Figure 1: Market clearing in a double auction
The x¯ units of the asset are traded at a market clearing price
p¯ ∈ [s(x¯), s(x¯+)] ∩ [d(x¯), d(x¯+)], (MCP)
where s(x¯+) and d(x¯+) denote the right limits of s and d, respectively. If
either d or s is continuous at x¯, as in Figure 1, then the market clearing price
is uniquely defined. If the vertical parts of d and s overlap, there is a whole
interval of possible market clearing prices. All involved sell orders have limit
prices less than or equal to the market clearing price and the involved buy orders
have limit prices greater than or equal to the market clearing price. Thus, the
agents involved in trading get to trade at a price at least as good as the ones
they were willing to accept.
The double auction mechanism has a variational formulation that will be
useful in further analysis. Indeed, the market clearing condition means that x¯ is
the largest among all x ≥ 0 that maximize the “consumer surplus” D(x)−S(x),
where S(x) is the least cost of buying x units from the potential sellers and
D(x) is the greatest revenue one could get by selling x units to potential buyers.
Mathematically,
S(x) = inf
xi
{∑
i∈I
Si(xi)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈I
xi = x
}
,
where
Si(xi) =
{
pai xi if xi ∈ [0, qai ],
+∞ otherwise.
Analogously,
D(x) = sup
xi
{∑
i∈I
Di(xi)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈I
xi = x
}
,
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where
Di(xi) =
{
pbixi if xi ∈ [0, qbi ],
−∞ otherwise.
The functions S and D can be expressed also as the indefinite integrals of
the supply curve and demand curves, s and d, respectively. Conversely, the
demand and supply curves d and s can recovered from the functions D and S
through the relations
∂D(x) = [d(x), d(x+)] and ∂S(x) = [s(x), s(x+)],
where ∂D(x) is the superdifferential of D at x, i.e. the set of prices p with
D(x) ≤ D(x¯) + p(x− x¯) ∀x ≥ 0.
Similarly, ∂S(x¯) is the subdifferential of S at x¯, i.e. the set of prices p with
S(x) ≥ S(x¯) + p(x− x¯) ∀x ≥ 0.
We refer the reader to [12, Section 23] for a general study of sub- and superdif-
ferential.
Condition (MCP) can now be written as
p ∈ ∂D(x¯) ∩ ∂S(x¯).
This implies that 0 ∈ ∂[D − S](x¯) which means that x¯ indeed maximizes the
consumer surplus D(x)− S(x) as claimed earlier. Besides this standard formu-
lation, there is another variational formulation of the double auction mechanism
that turns out to be useful when studying its efficiency. Indeed, plugging in the
definitions of D and S, we can write the surplus maximization problem as
maximize
∑
i∈I
Di(x
+
i )−
∑
i∈I
Si(x
−
i ) over x
+, x− ∈ RI
subject to
∑
i∈I
x+i =
∑
i∈I
x−i ,
where x+i and x
−
i denote the purchases and sales, respectively, of agent i. Note
that since pbi < p
a
i , one has either x
+
i = 0 or x
−
i = 0. Interpreting negative
purchases as sales and extending the definition of Di by
Di(zi) := sup
x+i ,x
−
i
{Di(x+i )− Si(x−i ) |x+i − x−i = zi}
=

pbizi if zi ∈ [0, qbi ],
pai zi if zi ∈ [−qai , 0],
−∞ if zi /∈ [−qai , qbi ],
4
we can write the market clearing problem more concisely as
maximize
∑
i∈I
Di(zi) over z ∈ RI
subject to
∑
i∈I
zi = 0.
(P )
The functions Di are concave since p
b
i < p
a
i . We will call Di the demand function
of agent i. It contains exactly the same information as the agents’ limit orders.
Submitting several buy and sell orders, an agent can effectively submit
any concave function to the exchange. Indeed, if agent i submits collections
(pbi,k, q
b
i,k)k∈K and (p
a
i,k, q
a
i,k)k∈K of bid and ask limit orders, we obtain the
same market clearing problem (P ) but now, agent i’s demand function becomes
Di(zi) = sup
x+i,k,x
−
i,k
{∑
k∈K
[Di,k(x
+
i.k)− Si,k(x−i,k)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
k∈K
[x+i,k − x−i,k] = zi
}
.
3 Price-taking agents in multi-asset auctions
Existing double auctions only involve two assets: the asset being auctioned
and cash. Our analysis will allow for multiple assets as it turns out that this
does not present any complications in theory. It will, however, allow us to
make comparisons with classical welfare economics and, in particular, general
equilibrium models. The situation with only one traded assets is covered as a
special case.
We will consider an economy with a finite set J of assets and assume that
agent i has initial endowment x0i ∈ RJ . We assume that the preferences of
agent i over different portfolios is measured by a utility function ui on RJ . We
allow for extended real-valued and nonsmooth ui so they allow for constraints,
production and uncertainties. For example, the agents could have “indirect
utilities” of the form
ui(xi) = sup{EPiUi(yi) | yi ∈ Yi(xi)},
where the correspondence Yi describes how an agent can transform a given
endowment xi to future outputs yi that may be subject to uncertainties. The
objective is to find a “production plan” that maximizes the expected utility as
defined by the agent’s subjective probability Pi and a utility function on the
uncertain outputs. Indirect utilities of the above form are often used to describe
rational agents in financial economics; see e.g. [1]. Indirect utility functions
incorporate agents’ information through the subjective probability measures Pi
which evolve at the arrival of news and other information. Changes in the
subjective probabilities would affect the indirect utilities ui and thus, market
clearing prices, as we see below.
We will assume nonstrategic bidding in the sense that each agent bids ac-
cording to their indifference prices (willingness to pay). In other words, the
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demand function agent i submits to the double auction is given by
Di(xi) := sup{r ∈ R |ui(x0i + xi − rg) ≥ ui(x0i )},
where g ∈ RJ denotes cash (or any other numeraire asset in terms of which all
prices are quoted). The value of Di(xi) is the greatest amount of cash agent
i would be wiling to pay for xi. Paying more would reduce the agent’s utility.
Recall that in the single-asset case, the demand function Di is in one-to-one
correspondence with the demand curve di which the agent can communicates to
the exchange by means of limit orders. Recall also that negative purchases are
interpreted as sales so that Si(xi) = −Di(−xi) gives the indifference price for
selling xi. Thus, both buyers and sellers can be described by the indifference
functions Di.
Price-taking behaviour in large economies has been justified under various
assumptions. Roberts and Postlewaite [11] assume a general exchange mecha-
nism and show that, possible gains from non-competitive behavior goes to zero
as the number of agents increases. Our assumption is akin to that made in
Friedman [6] who assumed that the agents neglect strategic feedback effects
and bid according to abstract strategies satisfying certain plausibility assump-
tions. Such assumptions are supported by Cason and Friedman [2] who find
that relatively simple bidding rules explain human behavior in double auctions
better than more sophisticated strategies. Plott [10, Chapter 10] studies three
two-sided auction mechanisms and finds that individuals tend to gain little from
strategic bidding.
The following will be assumed throughout.
Assumption 1. The utility functions ui are strictly increasing in g.
The following is a simple consequence of Assumption 1 and the upper semi-
continuity of ui; see e.g. [9, Proposition 2].
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, the function Di is concave and upper semi-
continuous with Di(0) = 0.
Let z ∈ RJ and consider the following perturbed market clearing problem
maximize
∑
i∈I
Di(xi) over x ∈ RI×J
subject to
∑
i∈I
xi = z.
(Pz)
The optimum value can be interpreted as the maximum revenue an auctioneer
could get by selling the portfolio z to the market participants. Clearly, when
z = 0, we recover the market clearing problem (P ).
Assumption 2. There is an ε > 0 such that the optimum value of (Pz) is
finite for all z ∈ RJ with |z| ≤ ε.
The following is a simple application of the classical optimality conditions
in convex optimization; see e.g. [12, Section 28].
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Theorem 2. Under Assumption 2, an x¯ solves (P ) if and only if there exists
a price vector p ∈ RJ such that
∂Di(x¯i) 3 p ∀i ∈ I, (1)∑
i∈I
x¯i = 0. (2)
The vector p in Theorem 2 is a market clearing price: agent i will pay p · x¯i
units of g for x¯i. At market clearing, the agent’s holdings will be updated to
x1i := x
0
i + x¯i − (p · x¯i)g.
Condition (1) means that
Di(xi) ≤ Di(x¯i) + p · (xi − x¯i) ∀xi ∈ RJ .
In particular,
Di(x¯i)− p · x¯i ≥ Di(0)− p · 0
where the right hand side equals zero under Assumption 1. Thus, the payment
p · x¯i is less than what the agent was prepared to pay for x¯i. Again, if a
component xji of xi is negative, then the agent is selling asset j and receiving
−pj x¯ji units of cash for it. Note that the market clearing condition (2) implies∑
i∈I
x1i =
∑
i∈I
x0i
so the new allocation is feasible.
Under Assumption 1, the double auction never decreases utilities. In other
words, the double auction makes a Pareto improvement of allocations. Indeed,
we have
x1i = x
0
i + x¯i −Di(x¯i)g + [Di(x¯i)− p · x¯i]g.
Under Assumption 1, Di(x¯i)− p · x¯i ≥ 0 and
ui(x
1
i ) ≥ ui(x0i + x¯i −Di(x¯i)g)
while ui(x
0
i + x¯i −Di(x¯i)g) ≥ ui(x0i ), by the definition of the indifference price
Di(x¯i). Thus,
ui(x
1
i ) ≥ ui(x0i )
where the inequality is strict unless Di(x¯i) = p · x¯i. The equality would mean
that agent i submitted a buy order with limit price equal to the market clearing
price.
Recall that the market clearing price need not be unique. The conclusions
drawn here do not depend on the choice but, in practice, of course, the choice
is important to all agents involved in market clearing.
Lemma 3. The condition ∂Di(x¯i) 3 p means that p · g = 1 and
p · (x0i + x¯i − wi) ≤ Di(x¯i) ∀wi ∈ RI : ui(wi) ≥ ui(x0i ).
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Proof. By definition, ∂Di(x¯i) 3 p means that
Di(xi) ≤ Di(x¯i) + p · (xi − x¯i) ∀xi ∈ RI
⇐⇒ r ≤ Di(x¯i) + p · (xi − x¯i) ∀xi ∈ RI , ∀r ∈ R : ui(x0i + xi − rg) ≥ ui(x0i )
⇐⇒ r ≤ Di(x¯i) + p · (wi − x0i + rg − x¯i) ∀wi ∈ RI , ∀r ∈ R : ui(wi) ≥ ui(x0i )
⇐⇒ p · g = 1, 0 ≤ Di(x¯i) + p · (wi − x0i − x¯i) ∀wi ∈ RI : ui(wi) ≥ ui(x0i ),
which proves the claim.
4 Double auction equilibria and Pareto alloca-
tions
Any feasible allocation x satisfies∑
i∈I
Di(xi) =
∑
i∈I
[Di(xi)− p · xi]
so the optimum value of (P ) may be interpreted as the total consumer surplus
generated by the double auction. In order to emphasise its dependence on the
current allocation x0, we will denote it by CS(x0). Since x = 0 is feasible in (P ),
and since Di(0) ≥ 0 under Assumption 1, we have CS(x0) ≥ 0. If CS(x0) = 0,
the market clearing problem is solved by x = 0, and we say that x0 is a double
auction equilibrium.
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the following are equivalent
1. x0 is a double auction equilibrium,
2. there is a price vector p with ∂Di(0) 3 p for all i ∈ I.
3. there is a price vector p with g · p = 1 and
p · wi ≥ p · x0i
for all wi with ui(wi) ≥ ui(x0i ).
Proof. The equivalence of the first two follows from Theorem 2 while the equiv-
alence of the last two follows from Lemma 3.
In the terminology of Debreu [4], Condition 3 in Lemma 4 means that x0 is a
valuation equilibrium with respect to p. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, valuation
equilibria thus coincide with double auction equilibria under nonstrategic bid-
ding. Debreu [4] proved that, under reasonable conditions, valuation equilibria
coincide with Pareto allocations. With the following lemma, one easily finds
that double auction equilibria coincide with Pareto allocations.
8
Lemma 5. The total surplus equals the optimum value of
maximize r over r ∈ R, w ∈ RI×J
subject to
∑
i∈I
wi + rg = 0,
ui(x
0
i + wi) ≥ ui(x0i ) i ∈ I.
(P’)
Proof. Using the definition of Di(xi), we can write problem (P ) as
maximize
∑
i∈I
ri over r ∈ RI , x ∈ RI×J
subject to
∑
i∈I
xi = 0,
ui(x
0
i + xi − rig) ≥ ui(x0i ) i ∈ I,
or in terms of wi := xi − rig, as
maximize
∑
i∈I
ri over r ∈ RI , w ∈ RI×J
subject to
∑
i∈I
wi +
∑
i∈I
rig = 0,
ui(x
0
i + wi) ≥ ui(x0i ) i ∈ I.
This is the problem in the statement with r =
∑
i∈I ri.
Theorem 6. Under Assumption 1, Pareto allocations are double auction equi-
libria. The converse holds under Assumption 3 below.
Proof. Assume that x0 is not a double auction equilibrium. By Lemma 5, there
is an r > 0 such that the constraints of problem (P’) are satisfied. We can then
construct another feasible allocation by giving rg to one of the agents. Under
Assumption 1, this would lead to strict increase of the agent’s utility so x0 can’t
be Pareto.
On the other hand, if x0 is not Pareto, there is a feasible allocation x˜ such
that ui(x˜i) ≥ ui(x0i ) for all i ∈ I and ui′(x˜i′) > ui(x0i′) for some i′ ∈ I. Under
Assumption 3, there is an r > 0 such that ui′(x˜i′ − rg) ≥ ui′(x0i′). Setting
wi =
{
x˜i − x0i for i 6= i′,
x˜i − rg − x0i for i = i′,
we would then obtain a feasible solution with strictly positive optimum value.
Thus, x0 would not be a double auction equilibrium.
Assumption 3. If xi is such that ui(xi) > ui(x
′
i) for some x
′
i ∈ domui then
ui(xi − εg) > −∞ for small enough ε > 0.
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Assumption 3 clearly holds if there is an x′i ∈ domui such that set {xi ∈
RJ |ui(xi) > ui(x′i)} is open, or if the effective domain
domui := {xi ∈ RJ |ui(xi) > −∞}
of ui is an open set. Both conditions hold if ui is finite everywhere since con-
cavity then implies that ui is continuous; see [12, Corollary 10.1.1].
The two implications in Theorem 6 were proved in Debreu [4] under slightly
different assumptions. The seemingly more involved separation argument used
in [4] is replaced here by Theorem 2, the proof of which also relies on separation.
5 Convergence to efficient allocations
In general, an agent’s demand function Di depends on her endowment x
0
i . After
market clearing, her endowment is changed to x1i = x
0
i + x¯
0
i − (p · x¯0i )g so her
demand may change too. There is no reason for the new allocation x1 to be a
double auction equilibrium, in general.
Assume now that the auction is repeated indefinitely and denote agent i’s
position after the tth auction by xti. That is,
xti := x
t−1
i + x¯
t
i − (pt · x¯ti)g,
where pt is the market clearing price and x¯ti is agent i’s purchase in the tth auc-
tion. Under fairly general conditions, the surplus decreases to zero if the auction
is repeated indefinitely. The following is a slight strengthening of Assumption 1.
Assumption 4. For every r > 0 there exists a δi > 0 such that
ui(xi + rg) ≥ ui(xi) + δir ∀xi ∈ B(r).
Assumption 4 is implied by Assumption 1 if ui is finite everywhere, or more
generally, if xi + rg ∈ int domui for all xi ∈ cl domui and r > 0. Concavity of
ui implies that the difference quotient
ui(xi + rg)− ui(xi)
r
is nonincreasing in r so the inequality in Assumption 4 implies
ui(xi + r
′g) ≥ ui(xi) + δir′
for any r′ ∈ (0, r].
An allocation x¯ said to be individually rational if ui(x¯i) ≥ ui(x0i ).
Theorem 7. Assume that the sequence (xt) is bounded and that Assumption 4
holds. Then CS(xt) decreases with t,
CS(xt) ≤ 1
t
∑
i∈I
ui(x
t
i)− ui(x0i )
δi
and the cluster points x¯ of (xt)∞t=0 are double auction equilibria and individually
rational. In particular, x¯ are Pareto efficient under Assumption 3.
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Proof. By Lemma 5, the total surplus CS(xt−1) of the tth auction is the opti-
mum value of
maximize r over r ∈ R, w ∈ RI×J
subject to
∑
i∈I
wi + rg = 0,
ui(x
t−1
i + wi) ≥ ui(xt−1i ) i ∈ I,
Making the change of variables zi = x
t−1
i + wi, we can write this as
maximize r over r ∈ R, w ∈ RI×J
subject to
∑
i∈I
(zi − xt−1i ) + rg = 0,
ui(zi) ≥ ui(xt−1i ) i ∈ I.
where ∑
i∈I
xt−1i =
∑
i∈I
x0i
since
∑
i∈I x¯
t
i = 0 for all t. Since ui(x
t
i) is nondecreasing in t for all i ∈ I,
the constraints become more restrictive with t so the optimum value CS(xt) is
nonincreasing.
Denote agent i’s surplus in the tth auction by CSi(x
t−1) := Di(x¯ti) − p · x¯ti
and let α > 0 be such that CSi(x
t) ≤ α and xti ∈ B(α) for all t. Writing
xti = x
t−1
i + x¯
t
i −Di(x¯ti)g + CSi(xt−1)g,
Assumption 4 gives
ui(x
t
i) ≥ ui(xt−1i + x¯ti −Di(x¯ti)g) + δiCSi(xt−1) ≥ ui(xt−1i ) + δiCSi(xt−1).
Adding up over iterations s = 1, . . . , t gives
δi
t−1∑
s=0
CSi(x
s) ≤ ui(xti)− ui(x0i )
and adding up over agents
t−1∑
s=0
CS(xs) ≤
∑
i∈I
ui(x
t
i)− ui(x0i )
δi
.
Since CS(xt) is nonincreasing in t, the left side is greater than tCS(xt) so
CS(xt) ≤ 1
t
∑
i∈I
ui(x
t
i)− ui(x0i )
δi
which proves the second claim.
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If x¯ is a cluster point of (xt), the upper semicontinuity of ui and the mono-
tonicity of ui(x
t
i) in t give
ui(x¯i) ≥ lim sup
t→∞
ui(x
t
i) = sup
k
ui(x
t
i).
Thus, by Lemma 5, CS(x¯) ≤ CS(xt) for all t so CS(x¯) = 0.
Theorem 7 restates the fundamental fact of welfare economics that competi-
tive markets lead to efficient allocations. While the classical Walrasian model of
the market leads to an equilibrium in a single trade, it assumes that the equilib-
rium prices are given exogenously or through a tatonnement process which is at
odds with existing market mechanisms. Our market model gives a more realistic
description of markets where prices are formed endogenously and the market
clearing needs to be iterated in order to reach equilibrium. Moreover, our result
gives a worst-case bound on the speed of convergence which has been observed
in extensive empirical studies ever since the pioneering works of Smith [14].
The assumption of boundedness of the sequence of allocations seems rather
reasonable from the practical perspective. Nevertheless, the following gives a
more concrete condition on the utilities that guarantees the boundedness.
Remark 8. A sequence generated by repeated auctions is bounded if
u∞i (xi) ≥ 0,
∑
i∈I
xi = 0 =⇒ x = 0,
where u∞i is the recession function of ui defined by
u∞i (xi) := inf
α>0
ui(x¯i + xi)− ui(x¯i)
α
,
for some x¯i ∈ domui (the definition is independent of x¯i ∈ domui); see [12,
Theorem 8.5]. The condition holds, in particular, if u∞i (xi) < 0 for xi /∈ RJ−.
This holds e.g. for the Cobb-Douglas utilities.
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